Executive Registry

83-5244/1

1 November 1983

NOTE FOR: Executive Director

FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Chuck,

I agree with Evan's and before him Bob's inclinations to get the CT Program back to a more Agency-wide focus. As a matter of fact, I recall that during the 1982 planning process during the discussion on personnel, I asked that we reinstate a broader Agency focus for the CT Program. I believe we also talked in terms of needing to fill the DDO's needs first, but once they were back up to speed, I had hoped to see an Agency-wide program. I believe Gates had some ideas on how to structure it so that non-DDO candidates would have some but not all of the DDO-oriented training. Your nickel.

hn N. McMahon

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REMARKS

Ev Hineman has requested an EXCOM to discuss the CT Program's "longer-term objectives" and whether it should be Agency-wide.

I pulled the JOT History and extracted in the attached some pertinent pieces. Note a certain deja vu re quotas, university contacts, internals, use of test results, etc.

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OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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NOTES FROM: JOT History 1950-66 [OTR-11, June 1973]

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2 OSO/OPC had a Training Division for clandestine activity. No Agency program for recruitment and training for the intelligence profession.

6 Baird was retired Army - reactivated for Korea in Air Force: not member of OSS club and not accepted.

12 Baird's deputy, [ ] had much informal university contact.   25X1

15 CS (Clandestine Service=DDP) didn't accept JOTs early on -- not til early 1953.

36 Elite corps concept was not a Baird concept: to the contrary. It stemmed from OSS old-boy suspicion of Baird.

44 Original concept: "University Contacts" plan -- at 50 colleges [faculty or admin members] "spot" for Agency; individuals cleared and brought in once a year to HQ [ ]   25X1

47 OTR to run professional trainee program - OP to assist: D/OTR did not think it necessary to identify contacts; only 7 OP recruiters in field. Problem. Additional source of JOTs envisioned: Armed Forces separation centers.

50 [ ] description of kind of officer wanted: brains, loyal, money not main objective   25X1
   in life, one who can take it mentally, stable, hard-working, realistic.

56-57 University Consultant target never reached - actual effectiveness questionable [retro-
   spective evaluation done by [ ] in 1971: see pg 60].   25X1

65 Quotas not reached: early 1963 [ ]   25X1
   D/OP was asked for explanation. Shortfall continued thru 1966; reasons: shortage
   of field recruiters; processing dropout. Ratio of those put in process to those EOD, 8:1.

70 Clearance delay biggest dropout factor.

71 So - advertise (1961); increase alumni use; increase business contacts

73 After 1950-66 recruiting period, problem still unsolved. Solution: internals [NOTE:
   1951 Baird study envisioned: 1) a professional trainee program; 2) the career corps
   program (the latter for selection of outstanding young employees for training and
   career development).]

77 Internals comprised, eventually, 1/4 of the class totals - and were most beneficial
   to the program.

88 Test results: [ ] regretted growing tendency by psychologists to use them as   25X1
   "absolute determinations of suitability".

89 Soon, psychiatrists were doing actual selections of candidates instead of simply
   indicating qualifications or disqualifications.

95 IG survey recommended increase in JOT Division staff for one each from DDS, DDP, DDI
   [1956].

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25X1

99   "If there was any one factor in [____] leadership . . . it was his adamant refusal
to compromise the quality of the program."

102 Monitoring of on-the-job performance was one of the [JOT Division] staff officer's
most important duties.

103 "DTR was always sensitive to student criticism -- often without determining the
validity of it."

112 Thru mid-54, the six-week Basic Intelligence Course constituted the formal training
program for JOTs . . . after initial aloofness, the CS received about 75% of the
JOTs; Phase II of Ops Courses opened to them. By 1956 new courses: Intelligence
Orientation (2 weeks); Intl.Communism (2 weeks); and Intelligence Techniques (4 weeks):
first two mandatory for all Agency professionals.

115 By 1958, Program was major source of young professionals - decision to systematize
recruiting and selection for EOD once a year in one group.

125 Concept of bringing all new professionals in via JOT program gained popularity -- but
not in OTR, who thought it would defeat one of the major objectives of the program; viz,
placement after demonstrated competence for and interest in the specific job . . .
DDS and ExDir decision in 1964 to increase number of annual JOT classes from two to

25X1

126 Recruiting fell far below established goals; individual classes much smaller than the
plans stipulated. Concept of bringing in all professionals through the JOT program
faded away.

143 IG report (1956) addressed the need for a scheduled program for recruitment of JOTs
and systematic EOD of pre-determined number for scheduled placement after training.
No practicable quota system was developed until 1959.

145 By Feb 1960 the JOT staff "tried to approach reality by establishing its own quotas for
component assignments".

156 "JOT staff control after training . . . [was] eroded by budget pressures and the DDP's
need for productive bodies".

158 Major Problems: Control of the Program [OTR or OP?]. IG suggested merging OP and OTR
under a single Director.

162 Tom Karamessines, DDP/TRO, said "instead of expanding the program someone should raise
the question whether or not OTR and O/Pers were recruiting too many JOTs . . . he
didn't think all new professionals should come in through the JOTP, the divisions
should be allowed to recruit directly."

171 Causes of attrition: disenchantment with training; discontent with initial job assign-
ments; dissatisfaction with promotion policy; [completion of military commitments -
for Military JOTs]; offers of better paying jobs and - among women JOTs - marriage.

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194 "Perhaps the most significant experiential lesson that can be drawn from the history of the JOT program is that the success of the program probably derived from the fact that it was conducted not as a personnel program but as a program for people -- carefully selected people who became distinct individuals at the beginning and remained so throughout the training and placement periods."

206 [   ] charge to new JOTs: "You enter the CIA to serve your country, not for self-aggrandizement, public recognition or an exciting life in exotic parts of the world. Ours is difficult work, requiring a keen mind, selfless effort, personal sacrifice and utmost dedication . . ."

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